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Ralf Koetter, Ton Kalker, Keesook J. Han
Abstract—Random linear network coding can be used in peer-
to-peer networks to increase the efﬁciency of content distribution
and distributed storage. However, these systems are particularly
susceptible to Byzantine attacks. We quantify the impact of
Byzantine attacks on the coded system by evaluating the prob-
ability that a receiver node fails to correctly recover a ﬁle. We
show that even for a small probability of attack, the system
fails with overwhelming probability. We then propose a novel
signature scheme that allows packet-level Byzantine detection.
This scheme allows one-hop containment of the contamination,
and saves bandwidth by allowing nodes to detect and drop the
contaminated packets. We compare the net cost of our signature
scheme with various other Byzantine schemes, and show that
when the probability of Byzantine attacks is high, our scheme is
the most bandwidth efﬁcient.
Index Terms—Network coding, Byzantine, security, peer to
peer, distributed storage, content distribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network coding [1], an alternative to the traditional forward-
ing paradigm, allows algebraic mixing of packets in a network.
It maximizes throughput for multicast transmissions [2], [3],
[4], robustness against failures [5] and erasures [6]. Random
linear network coding (RLNC), in which nodes independently
take random linear combination of the packets, is sufﬁcient for
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multicast networks [7], and is suitable for dynamic/unstable
networks, such as peer-to-peer (P2P) networks [8], [9].
A P2P network is a cooperative network in which storage
and bandwidth resources are shared in a distributed architec-
ture. This is a cost-effective and scalable way to distribute
content to a large number of receivers. One such architecture
is the BitTorrent system [10], which splits large ﬁles into small
blocks. After a node downloads a block, it acts as a source
for that particular block. The main challenges in these systems
are the scheduling and management of rare blocks.
As an alternative to current strategies for these challenges,
[8], [9] propose the use of RLNC to increase the efﬁciency
of content distribution in a P2P solution. These schemes are
completely distributed and eliminate the need of a scheduler,
since each node independently forwards a random linear
combination. In addition, there is a high probability that each
packet a node receives is linearly independent of the previous
ones, and thus, the problem of redundancy caused by the
ﬂooding approaches in traditional P2P networks is reduced.
RLNC based schemes signiﬁcantly reduce the downloading
time and improve the robustness of the system [8], [11].
Despite their desirable properties, network coded P2P sys-
tems are particularly susceptible to Byzantine attacks [12],
[13], [14] – the injection of corrupted packets into the in-
formation ﬂow. Since network coding relies on mixing of
packets, a single corrupted packet may easily corrupt the entire
information ﬂow [15], [16]. Furthermore, in P2P networks,
there is typically no security control over the nodes that
join the network and the packets that they redistribute. The
topologies of the overlay graphs that arise from traditional
P2P networks are often modeled as scale-free and small-world
networks [17], [18], which are prone to the dissemination
of epidemics, such as worms and viruses [19], [20]. Several
authors address these problems in coded P2P networks. We
shall discuss these countermeasures in Section II. Most of
these can be divided into two main categories: (i) end-to-end
error correction and (ii) misbehavior detection.
Motivated by these observations, we address the issues of
Byzantine adversaries in coded P2P networks. This paper is
based on work from [21], [22], [23]. The main contributions
of this paper are as follows:
² We propose a model for the evaluation of the impact
of Byzantine attacks in coded P2P networks, and provide
analytical results which show that, even for a small proba-
bility of attack, the information can become contaminated
with overwhelming probability.
² We propose a new efﬁcient, packet-based signature
scheme, designed speciﬁcally for RLNC systems, to2
detect Byzantine attacks by checking the membership of
a received packet in the valid vector space. This scheme
allows an one-hop containment of the contamination.
² We analyze the overhead in terms of bandwidth associ-
ated with our signature scheme, and compare it to that
of various Byzantine detection schemes. We also show
that our scheme is the most bandwidth efﬁcient if the
probability of attack is high.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II gives an
overview of network coding in P2P networks and existing
Byzantine detection schemes. In Section III, we analyze the
impact of Byzantine attacks on the system. We propose our
signature scheme in Section IV, and compare its overhead with
other schemes in Section V. We conclude in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Network coding in P2P networks
References [6], [7] propose a random block linear network
coding system – a simple, practical capacity-achieving code,
in which nodes independently construct their linear code
randomly. In such a system, a source generates information in
batches of G packets (called a generation). The source then
multicasts to its destination nodes using RLNC, where only the
packets from the same generation are mixed. Note that RLNC
is a distributed protocol, which requires no state information;
thus, making it suitable for dynamic and unstable networks.
Several authors have evaluated the performance of network
coding in P2P networks. Gkantsidis et al. [9] propose a scheme
for content distribution of large ﬁles in which nodes make
forwarding decisions solely based on local information. This
scheme improves the expected ﬁle download time and the
robustness of the system. Reference [8] compares the perfor-
mance of network coding with traditional coding measures in a
distributed storage setting with very limited storage space with
the goal of minimizing the storage locations a ﬁle-downloader
connects to. They show that RLNC performs well without a
large amount of additional storage space. Dimakis et al. [24]
introduce a graph-theoretic framework for P2P distributed sys-
tem, and show that RLNC minimizes the required bandwidth
to maintain the distributed storage architectures.
B. Byzantine detection scheme for network coded systems
1) End-to-end error correction scheme: Reference [25]
introduces network error correction for coded systems. They
bound the maximum achievable rate in an adversarial setting,
and generalize the Hamming, Gilbert-Varshamov, and Single-
ton bounds. Jaggi et al. [15] introduce the ﬁrst distributed
polynomial-time rate-optimal network codes that work in the
presence of Byzantine nodes and are information-theoretically
secure. The adversarial nodes are viewed as a secondary
source. The source adds redundancy to help the receivers distill
out the source information from the received mixtures. This
work is generalized in [26], [27].
2) Generation-based Byzantine detection scheme: Ho et al.
[28] introduce an information-theoretic approach for detecting
Byzantine adversaries, which only assumes that the adversary
did not see all linear combinations received by the receivers.
Their detection probability varies with the length of the hash,
ﬁeld size, and the amount of information unknown to the
adversary. A polynomial hash is added to each packet in the
generation. Once the destination node receives enough packets
to decode a generation, it can probabilistically detect errors.
The intuition behind this scheme is that if a packet is valid,
then its data and hash are consistent with its coding vector;
and a linear combination of valid packets is also valid.
3) Packet-based Byzantine detection scheme: There are
several signature schemes that have been presented in the
literature. For instance, [29] proposes a signature scheme for
network coding based on Weil pairing on elliptic curves.
Elliptic curves are hard to analyze and are known to be com-
putationally expensive [30]. The experimental results in [31]
show that this scheme is indeed costly and time-consuming.
Reference [32] uses homomorphic hash functions to verify
packets in P2P systems, and [16] extends this approach to
secure network coded P2P systems against Byzantine attacks.
However, [16] requires a secure channel to transmit the hashes
to all receivers before data is delivered. In this paper, we
assume that no such secure channel is available.
Reference [31] proposes a homomorphic signature scheme
with RSA encryption/decryption to allow authentication and
veriﬁcation of data. Unfortunately, the scheme is incorrect1.
This homomorphic property does not hold due to an error in
the second to last equation in (12) of [31]; that is:
(a mod p) £ (b mod p) mod r 6= (ab mod p) mod r:
In this paper, we propose a new homomorphic signature
scheme, which is both efﬁcient and does not require a secure
channel.
III. IMPACT OF BYZANTINE ATTACKS ON P2P NETWORKS
In Section III-A, we introduce our model for evaluating the
probability of a distributed denial of service attack (DDoS)
caused by Byzantine nodes in a P2P network. We then present
analytic results for two distinct scenarios in Section III-B, and
a qualitative interpretation of the results in Section III-C.
A. Model
We consider a directed graph with a set of nodes N. A
source node has a large ﬁle to be sent to receiver nodes. The
ﬁle is divided into m packets. The source connects to a subset
of nodes, Ns µ N, chosen uniformly at random, and sends
each of them a different random linear combination of the
original packets. To ensure that enough degrees of freedom
exist in the network, jNsj ¸ m. We refer to the nodes in Ns
as level-s nodes. A tracker keeps track of the list of informed
nodes N(t), i.e., nodes that keep information packets.
For a receiver to retrieve the ﬁle, it connects to a subset of
nodes Nr µ N, chosen uniformly at random, with jNrj ¸
jNsj. We refer to the nodes in Nr as level-r nodes. Note that
there may be an overlap between level-s and level-r. In each
1This fact has been communicated to the authors of [31] by Anthony E.
Kim, Raluca Ada Popa, and Muriel M´ edard, and acknowledged by the authors.3
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Fig. 1. Network model. The source is connected to the level-s nodes, and the
receiver is connected to the level-r nodes. The dark nodes are the informed
nodes. The level-r nodes take turns to contact the tracker to connects to jDj =
2 level-s nodes based on the list returned by the tracker. Here, nodes nr1 and
nr2 have completed this process, and the other level-r nodes have not.
time slot, one of the uninformed level-r nodes, n 2 Nr n Ns,
contacts the tracker to retrieve a random list of d informed
nodes, where d < jNsj. The node n then connects to these
informed nodes through a secure overlay connection, retrieves
their packets, and stores a single random linear combination of
these packets. During the same time slot, the tracker updates its
list of informed nodes to N(t)[fng. This process is repeated
for all nodes in Nr n Ns, and then all level-r nodes forward
their stored packets to the receiver. In order to maximize the
probability of storing linearly independent combinations in
level-r nodes and ensure decodability at the receiver, we set
d ¸ 2. Although we assume that each node in level-s and level-
r stores only one packet, the model can be easily generalized
to account for higher numbers. An example of this network
model is shown in Figure 1. Note that the tracker is considered
to be a trusted party in our model – in fact, as in the case of
most P2P protocols, a dishonest tracker would yield a protocol
failure with overwhelming probability.
We deﬁne an Information Contact Graph G(t) =
fN(t);A(t)g to denote the evolving graph formed in the
above process, where N(t) is the list of informed nodes
and A(t) is the set of overlay links that connect the level-
s and level-r nodes. The probability that a node becomes a
Byzantine attacker is pb. An attacker corrupts the packet it
stores by generating arbitrary content while complying to the
standard packet format. A node independently decides whether
it becomes Byzantine at the start of the ﬁle dissemination
process according to pb and stays that way throughout the
process. We deﬁne an indicator variable Ib(n) which is 1
if node n is Byzantine and 0 otherwise. The tracker has no
information about which nodes are Byzantine. A contaminated
packet is a packet that is either directly corrupted by an
attacker, or is a linear combination that involves at least one
contaminated packet. A contaminated node is a node that
stores a contaminated packet. The blocking probability ª is the
probability that the receiver collects at least one contaminated
packet, and thus, is unable to decode the ﬁle. This is equivalent
to the attacker successfully carries out a DDoS attack.
B. Analysis of Impact of Byzantine Attacks
We now evaluate the blocking probability at the receiver.
We then consider the expected number of contaminated nodes
at any given time. First, we introduce necessary deﬁnitions,
as follows. We deﬁne an indicator variable Ic(t;n) which is
equal to 1 if node n is contaminated at time t and 0 otherwise.
C(t) is a random variable for the number of contaminated
nodes in N(t), and C(t) = jN(t)j ¡ C(t) is the number of
uncontaminated nodes. The function B(k;n;p) denotes the
binomial distribution where
B(k;n;p) =
µ
n
k
¶
pk(1 ¡ p)(n¡k):
The function h(k;N;m;n) denotes the hypergeometric distri-
bution, in which
h(k;N;m;n) =
µ
m
k
¶µ
N ¡ m
n ¡ k
¶
=
µ
N
m
¶
:
Let Nb denote the number of informed Byzantine nodes at
time t = 0, that is, the number of Byzantine nodes in Ns. Nb
has a binomial distribution with parameters (jNsj;pb).
We consider two scenarios. In Theorem 1, for simplicity,
we consider a static informed nodes list, in which the list kept
by the tracker is ﬁxed to Ns. In this case, level-r nodes only
connect to level-s nodes. Second, in Theorem 2, we generalize
to the case in which the tracker updates its list of informed
nodes to N(t), as stated in Section III-A.
Theorem 1 (Static Informed Nodes List): Let G(t) be an
information contact graph in which nodes in Nr only connect
to nodes in Ns. Then its blocking probability ª is given by
ª = 1 ¡
jNsj X
y=0
h(y;jNj;jNsj;jNrj)
0
@
jNsj X
i=0
B(i;jNsj;pb)f(i;y)
1
A;
f(i;y) =
µ
1 ¡
i
jNsj
¶y ·
(1 ¡ pb)h(0;jNsj;i;d)
¸jNrj¡y
:
Proof: We consider two disjoint subsets of Nr: the set
of informed nodes at t = 0, that is, Nr \ Ns, and the
uninformed nodes, that is, NrnNs. Let Y be a random variable
for the number of nodes in Nr \Ns. Y has a hypergeometric
distribution, P(Y = y) = h(y;jNj;jNsj;jNrj).
We ﬁrst consider n 2 Nr \ Ns. Given Nb = i and Y =
y, the probability that n is uncontaminated is equal to the
probability that it is not initially Byzantine, which is equal to
1 ¡ i=jNsj. Then, the probability that all nodes in Nr \ Ns
are uncontaminated is
³
1 ¡ i
jNsj
´y
.
Now, at each timeslot t > 0, a node n 2 NrnNs becomes
informed. For n to be uncontaminated, it must not be Byzan-
tine and it must connect to d uncontaminated nodes. Then,
P(Ic(t;n) = 0jNb = i;Y = y) = (1 ¡ pb)h(0;jNsj;i;d):
It follows that the probability that all nodes in NrnNs are
uncontaminated at time t is
¡
(1 ¡ pb)h(0;jNsj;i;d)
¢t
; for 0 · t · jNrj ¡ y:
Note that since jNrnNsj nodes are added, the information
dissemination process ends at t = jNrj ¡ y. Now, the4
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Fig. 2. Markov diagram for the dissemination process, jNrj ¡ Y = 2.
The transitions to the left (dotted arrows) represent the addition of an
uncontaminated node, and the transitions to the right (ﬁlled arrows) represent
the addition of a contaminated node. The grey states are considered in
computing ª, that is, the states in which no contaminated nodes are added.
probability that only uncontaminated nodes exist in Nr at time
t = jNrj ¡ y, conditioned on Y = y and Nb = i, is
f(i;y) =
µ
1 ¡
i
jNsj
¶y ·
(1 ¡ pb)h(0;jNsj;i;d)
¸jNrj¡y
:
Nb has a binomial distribution, Y has a hypergeometric
distribution and they are independent of each other. Taking
out these two conditions, the probability that all nodes in Nr
are uncontaminated is given by
° =
jNsj X
y=0
h(y;jNj;jNsj;jNrj)
0
@
jNsj X
i=0
B(i;jNsj;pb)f(i;y)
1
A:
It follows that the blocking probability is ª = 1 ¡ °.
We now consider that the list of informed nodes N(t) at
the tracker is updated with each new informed level-r node.
Theorem 2 (Evolving informed nodes list): Let G(t) be an
information contact graph in which nodes in jNrnNsj connect
to nodes in N(t). Then its blocking probability ª is:
ª=1 ¡
jNsj X
y=0
h(y;jNj;jNsj;jNrj)
0
@
jNsj X
i=0
B(i;jNsj;pb)f(i;y)
1
A;
f(i;y)=
µ
1 ¡
i
jNsj
¶y " jNrj¡y Y
t=1
(1 ¡ pb)h(0;jNsj + t ¡ 1;i;d)
#
:
Proof: Recall from Theorem 1 that we consider two
disjoint subsets of Nr, that is, Nr\Ns and NrnNs. As before,
Y is the number of nodes in Nr \ Ns. Again, at time t = 0,
the probability that all nodes in Nr \ Ns are uncontaminated
given Nb = i and Y = y is (1 ¡ i=jNsj)y.
We now consider the nodes in NrnNs and assume Nb =
i;Y = y. At each time step, there are C(t) contaminated
nodes and C(t) = jNsj + t ¡ C(t) uncontaminated nodes
in N(t). The probability of obtaining a contaminated node
at time t + 1 is only dependent on C(t) and C(t), and
thus, we can model these probabilities by Markov chains
¥jNb;Y = fS;Pg, in which S represents the set of states
and P represents the matrix of transition probabilities. A
state in S is represented by s = (C(t);C(t)). Transitions
from s are only possible to s0 = (C(t) + 1;C(t)) and to
s00 = (C(t);C(t) + 1). It is also important to note that the
depth of the Markov chain is equal to jNrnNsj = jNrj ¡ y.
The transition probabilities from s when adding a node n
are P(s ! s0) = P(Ic(t + 1;n) = 1jC(t);C(t);Nb;Y )
and P(s ! s00) = P(Ic(t + 1;n) = 0jC(t);C(t);Nb;Y ).
¥jNb;Y is illustrated in Figure 2 for jNrnNsj = 2.
Let us denote C(t) as x and t0 = jNsj + t, it follows that
C(t) = t0 ¡ x. Let pt
fsg = pt
fx;t¡xg denote the probability of
being in state s at time t, and
pt
fx;t0¡xg = p
t¡1
fx¡1;t0¡xgp(fx¡1;t0¡xg!fx;t0¡xg)
+ p
t¡1
fx;t0¡x¡1gp(fx;t0¡x¡1g!fx;t0¡xg);
p(fx;t0¡xg!fx+1;t0¡xg)
= 1 ¡ P(Ic(t;n) = 0jx;t0 ¡ x;Nb = i;Y = y);
p(fx;t0¡xg!fx;t0¡x+1g)
= P(Ic(t;n) = 0jx;t0 ¡ x;Nb = i;Y = y);
p0
fi;jNsj¡ig = 1:
Now, consider that node n is active at time t. The probability
of n being uncontaminated is the probability that it is not
Byzantine and does not connect to contaminated nodes. Thus,
P(Ic(t;n) = 0jC(t ¡ 1);C(t ¡ 1);Nb = i;Y = y)
= (1 ¡ pb)h(0;jNsj + t ¡ 1;C(t ¡ 1);d):
Now, notice that the probability of only having uncontam-
inated nodes at time t = jNrj ¡ y is the probability of,
starting in state (C(0);C(0)) = (i;jNsj ¡ i), ending in state
(i;jNsj ¡ i + jNrj ¡ y) after jNrj ¡ y steps: in that case, no
contaminated node is added to the network. The probability
of this event, conditioned on Nb = i and Y = y, is
jNrj¡y Y
t=1
P(Ic(t;n) = 0jC(t ¡ 1);C(t ¡ 1);Nb = i;Y = y)
=
jNrj¡y Y
t=1
(1 ¡ pb)h(0;jNsj + t ¡ 1;i;d):
Combining the results for sets Nr \ Ns and NrnNs, we
have that the probability that no contaminated nodes exist in
Nr given that Nb = i and Y = y is given by
f(i;y) =
µ
1 ¡
i
jNsj
¶y " jNrj¡y Y
t=1
(1¡pb)h(0;jNsj+t¡1;i;d)
#
:
Finally, it follows that ª at time jNrnNsj is
ª = 1¡
jNsj X
y=0
h(y;jNj;jNsj;jNrj)
0
@
jNsj X
i=0
B(i;jNsj;pb)f(i;y)
1
A:
C. Interpretation of the Impact of Byzantine Attacks
The results from Theorems 1 and 2 are illustrated in
Figure 3. Not surprisingly, the blocking probability ª grows
exponentially with pb for both Theorems. This is because it is
sufﬁcient for a single level-r node to connect to a Byzantine
node in level-s to contaminate the receiver. Figure 3 indicates
that ª grows faster for the evolving informed node list than for
the static informed node list. This is due to the fact that as more
nodes are added to the network, the presence of contaminated
nodes becomes more likely, and thus, the probability that
a level-r node connects to at least one contaminated node5
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increases. These results show that even the na¨ ıve attacker
(randomly contaminating nodes) can carry out a very effective
DDoS attack on a P2P network.
The probability ª also increases with other parameters such
as d, jNsj, and jNrj. These parameters increase the number
of connections as well as the number of nodes within the
information contact graph G(t), thus increasing the probability
of level-r nodes connecting to contaminated nodes.
It is important to note that ª does not capture the impact of
the Byzantine attack completely. The probability ª represents
the likelihood of a successful DDoS attack to a receiver;
however, it does not capture how much of the network has been
contaminated. The number of contaminated nodes, C(t), is
closely tied with the topology of the information contact graph
G(t). From Section III-B, we observe that C(t) is dependent
on the random variable Y = jNr \ Nsj. Nodes n 2 Y are
directly connected to the source and the receiver (since they
are both level-s and level-r nodes). Therefore, the probability
that n is contaminated is only dependent on pb, while the
probability that n0 2 Nr nNs is contaminated is dependent on
pb as well as connecting to a contaminated node in Ns. Thus,
C(t) decreases as jY j increases for any given pb.
For a given topology (conditioned on Y = y), we can
perform an analysis of E[C(t)]. (We do not provide the details
of this for want of space.) For the case of static informed node
list, E[C(t)jY = y] is equal to
jNsj X
i=0
B(i;jNsj;pb)
µ
i + t(1 ¡ (1 ¡ pb)h(0;jNsj;i;d))
¶
:
In the case of the evolving informed nodes list,
E[C(t)jY = y] =
jNsj X
i=0
B(i;jNsj;pb)
µ i+t X
x=i
xpt
fx;t0¡xg
¶
:
To visualize the above results, we plot E[C(t)jY = 1] with
the same set of parameters as in Figure 3. Figure 4 shows that
the expected number of contaminated nodes in the static case is
linear with time. For small probabilities pb, the E[C(t)jY = 1]
is higher for the evolving case; as pb increases, the expected
number of C(t) for both cases behave more similarly.
IV. SIGNATURE SCHEME FOR BYZANTINE DETECTION
From the previous Section, we can see that coded P2P
networks are highly vulnerable to Byzantine attacks, and the
contamination can quickly spread throughout the network.
Although we only consider a particular network model in
Section III for the purpose of analysis, such problems exist
in all network coded systems. Therefore, it is desirable to
have a signature scheme that validates each received packet
without decoding the whole ﬁle. Then the contamination can
be contained in one-hop, and we can avoid the decoding delay.
In uncoded systems, the source knows all the packets that are
transmitted in the network, and therefore, can sign each one of
them. However, in a coded system, each node produces “new”
packets, and standard digital signature schemes do not apply.
Previous work that attempts to solve this problem is based on
homomorphic hash functions [8], [32], [31], Secure Random
Checkup [16], or Weil pairing on elliptic curves [29]. In this
section, we introduce a novel signature scheme for the coded
system based on the Discrete Logarithm problem.
We consider a directed graph with a set of nodes N. A
source node has a large ﬁle to be sent to receiver nodes.
The ﬁle is divided into m packets. A node in the network
receives linear combinations of the packets from the source
or from other nodes. In this framework, a node is also a
server to packets it has downloaded, and always sends out
random linear combinations of all the packets it has obtained
so far to other nodes. When a receiver has received m linearly
independent packets, it can re-construct the whole ﬁle. We
denote the m original packets as ¹ v1;:::;¹ vm, and view them as
elements in l-dimensional vector space Fl
p, where p is a prime.
The source node adds coding vectors to create v1;:::;vm,
vi = (0;:::;1;:::;0; ¹ vi1;:::; ¹ vil), where the ﬁrst m elements
are zero except the ith element which is 1, and ¹ vij 2 Fp is
the jth element in ¹ vi. A packet w received by a node is a
linear combination of these vectors,
w =
m X
i=1
¯ivi;
where (¯1;:::;¯m) is the global coding vector.
The key observation for our signature scheme is that the
vectors v1;:::;vm span a subspace V of Fm+l
p , and a received6
vector w is a valid linear combination of vectors v1;:::;vm if
and only if it belongs to V . Our scheme is based on standard
modulo arithmetic (in particular the hardness of the Discrete
Logarithm problem) and on an invariant signature for the linear
span V . Each node veriﬁes the integrity of a received vector w
by checking the membership of w in V based on the signature.
Our scheme is deﬁned by the following ingredients:
² q: a large prime number such that p is a divisor of q¡1.
Note that standard techniques, such as that used in Digital
Signature Algorithm (DSA) [33], apply to ﬁnding such
q.
² g: a generator of the group G of order p in Fq. Since the
order of the multiplicative group F¤
q is q ¡ 1 (a multiple
of p), there exists a subgroup, G, with order p in F¤
q.
² Private key: Ks = f®igi=1;:::;m+l, a random set of
elements in F¤
p, only known to the source.
² Public key: Kp = fhi = g®igi=1;:::;m+l, signed by some
standard signature scheme, e.g., DSA, and published by
the source.
To distribute a ﬁle in a secure manner, the signature scheme
works as follows.
1) Using the vectors v1;:::;vm from the ﬁle, the source
ﬁnds a vector u = (u1;:::;um+l) 2 Fm+l
p orthogonal to
all vectors in V . Speciﬁcally, u is a non-zero solution,
u 6= 0, such that vi ¢ u = 0 for i = 1;:::;m.
2) The source computes the vector x =
(u1=®1;u2=®2;:::;um+l=®m+l).
3) The source signs x with some standard signature scheme
and publishes x. We refer to the vector x as the signature
of the ﬁle being distributed.
4) The client node veriﬁes that x is signed by the source.
5) When a node receives a vector w and wants to verify
that w is in V , it computes
d =
m+l Y
i=1
h
xiwi
i ;
and veriﬁes that d = 1.
To see that d is equal to 1 for any valid w, we have
d =
m+l Y
i=1
h
xiwi
i =
m+l Y
i=1
(g®i)uiwi=®i =
m+l Y
i=1
guiwi
= g
Pm+l
i=1 (uiwi) = 1;
where the last equality comes from the fact that u is orthogonal
to all vectors in V .
Next, we show that the system described above is secure. In
essence, the theorem below shows that given a set of vectors
that satisfy the signature veriﬁcation criterion, it is provably at
least as hard as the Discrete Logarithm problem to ﬁnd new
vectors that also satisfy the veriﬁcation criterion other than
those that are in the linear span of the vectors already known.
Deﬁnition 1: Let p be a prime number and G be a multi-
plicative cyclic group of order p. Let k and n be two integers
such that k < n, and ¡ = fh1;:::;hng be a set of generators
of G. Given a linear subspace, V , of rank k in Fn
p such that
for every v 2 V , the equality ¡v ,
Qn
i=1 h
vi
i = 1 holds, we
deﬁne the (p;k;n)-Difﬁe-Hellman problem as the problem of
ﬁnding a vector w 2 Fn
p with ¡w = 1 but w = 2 V .
By this deﬁnition, the problem of ﬁnding an invalid vector
that satisﬁes our signature veriﬁcation criterion is a (p;m;m+
l)-Difﬁe-Hellman problem. Note that in general, the (p;n ¡
1;n)-Difﬁe-Hellman problem has no solution. This is because
if V has rank n ¡ 1 and a w0 exists such that ¡w
0
= 1
and w0 = 2 V , then w0 + V spans the whole space, and any
vector w 2 Fn
p would satisfy ¡w = 1. This is clearly not true,
therefore, no such w0 exists.
Theorem 3: For any k < n¡1, the (p;k;n)-Difﬁe-Hellman
problem is at least as hard as the Discrete Logarithm problem.
Proof: Assume there exists an efﬁcient algorithm to solve
the (p;k;n)-Difﬁe-Hellman problem, and we wish to compute
the discrete logarithm logg(z) for some z = gx, where g is a
generator of a cyclic group G with order p. We can choose two
random vectors r = (r1;:::;rn) and s = (s1;:::;sn) in Fn
p, and
construct ¡ = fh1;:::;hng, where hi = zrigsi for i = 1;:::;n.
We then ﬁnd k linearly independent (and otherwise random)
solutions v1;:::;vk to the equations
v ¢ r = 0 and v ¢ s = 0:
Note that there exist n ¡ 2 linearly independent vector so-
lutions to the above equations. Let V be the linear span
of fv1;:::;vkg, then any vector v 2 V satisﬁes ¡v = 1.
Now, if we have an algorithm for the (p;k;n)-Difﬁe-Hellman
problem, we can ﬁnd a vector w = 2 V such that ¡w = 1.
This vector would satisfy w ¢ (xr + s) = 0. Since r is
statistically independent from (xr+s), with probability greater
than 1¡1=p, we have w¢r 6= 0. In this case, we can compute
logg(z) = x =
w ¢ s
w ¢ r
:
Thus, the ability to solve the (p;k;n)-Difﬁe-Hellman problem
implies the ability to solve the Discrete Logarithm problem.
This proof is an adaptation of a proof in an earlier publica-
tion by Boneh et. al [34].
Our signature scheme makes use of the linearity property
of RLNC, and enables the nodes to check the integrity of
packets without a secure channel, unlike the homomorphic
hash function or SRC schemes [16], [32]. In addition, our
scheme does not require the nodes to decode coded packets to
check their validity – thus, is efﬁcient in terms of delay. The
computation involved in the signature generation and veriﬁca-
tion processes is very simple. Furthermore, our scheme uses
the Discrete Logarithm problem, which is more standardized
and widely used, compared to the recently developed Weil
pairing problem used in [29]. Lastly, we note that our signature
scheme is rateless [21], which is not the case in end-to-end or
generation based detection schemes.
V. OVERHEAD ANALYSIS
In the previous Sections, we showed that our signature
scheme is beneﬁcial, as even a small amount of attack can
have a devastating effect in coded networks. However, we
have not shown that this scheme is efﬁcient in terms of
bandwidth (i.e. overhead of augmenting the signature scheme),7
Fig. 5. Diagram of the network and node n
and indeed, it is not always the case that our signature scheme
is desirable. We now study the cost and beneﬁt of the following
three Byzantine schemes: 1) our signature scheme proposed
in Section IV, 2) end-to-end error correction scheme [15],
and 3) generation-based Byzantine detection scheme [6]. If
we implement Byzantine detection schemes, we can detect
contaminated data, drop them, and therefore, only transmit
valid data; however, this beneﬁt comes with the overhead
of the schemes in the forms of hashes and signatures. It is
important to note that, for the dropped data, the receivers
perform erasure correction, which is computationally lighter
than error correction; thus, there is no need of retransmissions.
We consider a node n 2 N in the network as in Section IV.
Node n wishes to check the validity of the data it forwards.
Assume that node n receives M packets per time slot. Recall
from Section IV that m is the number of original packets of
l-dimensional vector space Fl
p. The source adds the coding
vector to the original packets, where the ﬁrst m symbols
are the coding coefﬁcients. Therefore, the packet transmitted
consists of (m + l) symbols. If n detects an error, then
it discards that data; otherwise, it forwards the data. The
probability that n receives a contaminated packet is pn as
shown in Figure 5. Note that the probability pn of an attack
is topology dependent. However, in order to compare the
performance of various schemes, we use a generic per node
model to examine the overhead incurred at a node. We assume
that there is an external model of vulnerability which gives an
estimate of pn. Note that the blocking probability ª analyzed
in Section III provides such an estimate.
A. Overhead analysis of our packet-based signature scheme
We examine the overhead incurred by our signature scheme.
Recall from Section IV, the ﬁle size is mllogp bits. The ﬁle
is divided into m packets, each of which is a vector in Fl
p.
Thus, the overhead of the RLNC scheme is m=l times the
ﬁle size, and in practical networks m ¿ l. There are two
components to the overhead of our scheme. The ﬁrst is the cost
associated with the initial setup – i.e. publishing the public key
Kp; second is the signature vector x of the ﬁle.
We ﬁrst consider the cost of initial setup. Note that the
public key Kp is (m+l)log(q) bits. In typical cryptographic
applications, the sizes of p and q are 20 bytes (160 bits) and
128 bytes (1024 bits), respectively; thus, the size of Kp is
approximately 6(m+l)=ml times the ﬁle size. This overhead
is negligible as long as 6 ¿ m ¿ l. For example, if we have
a 10MB ﬁle divided into m = 100 packets, then the overhead
is approximately 6%. The second part of the overhead is
publishing the signature x, which is (m+l)log(p) bits. Thus,
for a 10MB ﬁle, the overhead is approximately 1%.
Note that the public key Kp cannot be fully reused for
multiple ﬁles, as it is possible for an attacker to generate a
vector which is not a valid linear combination of the original
vectors yet satisﬁes the check d = 1 using information
obtained from previously downloaded ﬁles. (We do not provide
the details of this for want of space.) To prevent this from
happening, we can redistribute keys for each additional ﬁle in
one of the two methods below. The ﬁrst method consists of
publishing a new public key Kp for each ﬁle, incurring an
overhead of 6(m + l)=ml times the ﬁle size. Note that if we
republish Kp for every ﬁle, we can reuse the signature x. The
second method is to update Kp partially and generate a new
x for each ﬁle. This incurs less overhead than the previous
method, however, requires a high variability in w for it to be
secure. This update incurs negligible amount of overhead. For
example, for a 10MB ﬁle, the overhead is less than 0.1%.
Thus, the initial setup costs approximately 6% of our ﬁrst
ﬁle size. For subsequent ﬁles, the incremental update of Kp
and x is less than 0.1% if we use the second method. Note that
if amortized over ´ ﬁles, our signature scheme would have an
overhead of
6+0:1(´¡1)
´ %. For example, if ´ = 10, overhead
of our signature scheme is less than 1%.
For simplicity, in the remaining of the paper, we assume that
we are distributing only one ﬁle. Therefore, we shall denote
the overhead associated with our signature by op , 6
100(m +
l) symbols per packet, i.e. 6% overhead – which is a gross
overestimate if we are distributing more than one ﬁle.
If n detects an error in a packet, then it discards it – by
doing so, n can ﬁlter out all the contaminated packets and use
its bandwidth to transmit only valid packets. Therefore, n only
forwards on average 1 ¡
op
m+l fraction of the data received.
Our signature scheme costs opM symbols per time slot.
However, by discarding the contaminated packets, node n can
on average save its bandwidth by M(m + l)pn symbols per
time slot. Therefore, the net cost of the signature scheme as a
fraction of the total data received is:
maxf0;Mop¡M(m+l)pn)g
M(m+l) =
maxf0;op¡(m+l)png
m+l : (1)
When pn is high, then checking each packet for error saves
on bandwidth – i.e. (op ¡ (m + l)pn) < 0, which shows that
the cost of the signature scheme is canceled by the bandwidth
gained from dropping the corrupted packets. Therefore, this
approach is the most sensible when the network is unreliable
or under heavy attack.
B. Overhead analysis of end-to-end error correction
In this subsection, we shall use the rate-optimal error correc-
tion codes from Jaggi et al. [15]. As long as the attack is within
the network capacity, this scheme allows the intermediate
nodes to transmit at the remaining network capacity, i.e. the
end-to-end network capacity minus the capacity the adversary
can contaminate. In this scenario, node n just naively performs
RLNC and forwards the data it has received. Therefore, node
n transmits on average M(m + l)pn contaminated symbols.
Thus, the net cost as a fraction of the total data received is:
M(m + l)pn
M(m + l)
= pn: (2)8
Fig. 6. Network with non-malicious nodes A, B, C, D, E, and F where node
A is transmitting at a total rate of r to node F; however, A sends half of its
data through B and the other half through C. Therefore, B and C can check
the validity of the sub-generation they receive, where by sub-generation, we
mean a collection of G=2 encoded packets from A. By a similar argument,
D, E, and F can check the validity of a sub-generation of G=4, G=4, and
G packets from A, respectively.
C. Overhead analysis of generation-based detection scheme
We now analyze the performance of the algorithm proposed
by Ho et al. [28], which uses random block linear network
coding with generation size G (although we have focused
on RLNC so far, it is possible to extend these results by
considering m as the generation size G). This scheme is very
cheap – with 2% overhead, the detection probability is at least
98.9%. We denote the overhead associated with this scheme
by og , 2
100(m + l)G symbols per generation.
After collecting enough packets from the generation, node
n checks for possible error in the generation, which can
incur large delay. If n detects an error, it discards the entire
generation of G packets; otherwise, it forwards the data. This
scheme requires only one hash for the entire generation –
saving bits on the hashes compared to our signature scheme.
However, it can be inefﬁcient, as one contaminated packet can
cause n to discard an entire generation. The probability pg of
dropping a generation of G packets is given by:
pg = 1 ¡ Pr(All G packets are valid) = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ pn)G:
The cost and beneﬁt of this scheme includes three compo-
nents: (i) the hash of og symbols per generation, (ii) valid
packets which are discarded if the generation is deemed
contaminated, and (iii) bandwidth saved by dropping contami-
nated packets. The expected number of valid symbols dropped
per generation is pg(1 ¡ pn)(m + l)G. The expected number
of contaminated symbols per generation is pn(m+l)G. Thus,
the net cost as a fraction of the total data received is:
maxf0;og + pg(1 ¡ pn)(m + l)G ¡ pn(m + l)Gg
(m + l)G
: (3)
For this scheme to work, n needs to receive at least G
packets from each generation to decode and detect errors. This
may seem to indicate that this scheme is only applicable as an
end-to-end scheme, but it can be extended to a local Byzantine
detection scheme as shown in Figure 6.
The cost of this scheme increases dramatically with G. If
G is large, the probability of at least one corrupted packet in
a generation is high even for a small pn. Thus, a large G is
undesirable, as almost every generation is found faulty and
dropped, making the throughput approach zero. This can be
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Fig. 7. Ratio between the expected overhead and the total data received
by a node with 1000 bit packets. For generation-based detection, G is
the generation size and og = 2
100(m + l)G. For packet-based detection,
op = 6
100(m + l).
veriﬁed with an asymptotic analysis of Equation 3:
lim
G!1
maxf0;og + pg(1 ¡ pn)(m + l)G ¡ pn(m + l)Gg
(m + l)G
! maxf0;1 ¡ 2png:
Note in Figure 7 that the cost peaks at pn ¼ 0:2. At pn ¼
0:2, the scheme drops many generations for a few corrupted
packets. Thus, at a moderate rate of attack, the generation-
based scheme suffers. When pn < 0:2, the generation-based
scheme does well, since pn is low and the cost of hash is
distributed across G packets. As pn increases to 0.5 from 0.2,
the throughput to the receiver decreases as more generations
are dropped. When p > 0:5, this scheme discards almost all
generations, thus, the expected throughput is near zero.
D. Trade-offs and comparisons
In Figures 7 and 8, we compare the three schemes. From
Section V-B, the expected cost of error correction scheme is
linearly proportional to pn. For large pn, this scheme performs
badly. However, this simple scheme where a node naively
forwards all data it receives outperforms the detection schemes
when pn is low (pn < 0:03). When pn is small, the overhead
of detection exceeds the cost introduced by the attackers.
When pn is low, the overhead of our signature is costly,
since we are devoting op symbols per packet to detect an
unlikely attack. In such a setting, the generation-based scheme
performs well, as it distributes the cost of the hash (og
symbols) over G packets. However, as pn increases, the cost of
our signature becomes negligible since the bandwidth wasted
by contaminated packets increases; thus, our signature scheme
outperforms the generation-based scheme.
Note that we may be underestimating the overhead as-
sociated with our signature scheme as we only take into
account the cost of publishing the public key Kp and the
signature x. We do not consider the cost of maintaining a
public key distribution infrastructure, which the generation-
based scheme does not require. Thus, depending on the public
key distribution infrastructure used, our scheme may incur a
higher overhead – resulting in an outward shift in the overhead9
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in Figure 7. However, it is important to note that in terms
of transmission cost, we overestimate the overhead op our
signature scheme. Recall from Section V-A, we set op = 6%
assuming that we are distributing only one ﬁle; however, if we
are distributing more ﬁles, op ¿ 1%.
We brieﬂy note the computational cost of these schemes.
When using a detection scheme, node n does not waste
its bandwidth in transmitting contaminated data by dropping
them. Furthermore, there is no need of retransmission of the
dropped data as the receivers can perform erasure correction
on the packets/generations that have been dropped. It is
important to note that for the end-to-end error correction
scheme, the receivers need to perform error correction, which
is computationally more expensive than erasure correction.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied the problem of Byzantine attacks
in network coded P2P networks. We used randomly evolving
graphs to characterize the impact of Byzantine attackers on
the receiver’s ability to recover a ﬁle. As shown by our
analysis, even a small number of attackers can contaminate
most of the ﬂow to the receivers. Motivated by this result,
we proposed a novel signature scheme for any network using
RLNC. The scheme makes use of the linearity of the code,
and it can be used to easily check the validity of all received
packets. Using this scheme, we can prevent the intermediate
nodes from spreading the contamination by allowing nodes
to detect contaminated data, drop them, and therefore, only
transmit valid data. We emphasize that there is no need of
retransmission for the dropped data since the receivers can
perform erasure correction, which is computationally cheaper
than error correction.
We analyzed the cost and beneﬁt of the signature scheme,
and compared it with various detection schemes. We showed
that the overhead of our scheme is low. Furthermore, when the
probability of attack is high, it is the most bandwidth efﬁcient.
However, if the probability of attack is low, generation-based
detection schemes are more appropriate.
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